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Abstract
The 2007 subprime crisis was caused by high demand for subprime mortgage products underpinned by the
unrealistic assumption that property prices would keep rising indefinitely. The subprime mortgage market
worked as expected as long as prices were rising and demand for property was high. When these two
conditions were violated and the housing bubble collapsed, the system became dysfunctional, many subprime
borrowers defaulted, and mortgage-backed securities lost much of their value. Prevention could have been
achieved through regulatory measures to shift the risk back from taxpayers and investors to loan originators.
Fair distribution of risk should be the main objective of regulators if such crises are to be avoided in the future.
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The US subprime mortgage crisis of 2007 was the trigger of the global 
recession of the late 2000s. The interdependence of the housing market and the 
financial system proved complex and unpredictable; the shockwaves originating 
from the 2006 low point in the housing cycle could not be absorbed properly, 
spilling over to investment banking, eroding the confidence of investors and 
consumers, drying up credit flows, and causing a global financial panic. Different 
explanations have been proposed: deregulation of banking and finance after 1980, 
government housing policy, and the lower interest rates introduced by the Federal 
Reserve after 2001. However, the Great Recession would not have happened 
without the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007. The collapse in subprime lending 
arose from a type of information asymmetry known as moral hazard. Paul 
Krugman (2009: 34) defines moral hazard as “any situation in which one person 
makes the decision about how much risk to take, while someone else bears the 
cost if things go badly." Short-sightedness and overconfidence, termed “irrational 
exuberance” by Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve in the 1990s, 
formed the attitudes that eroded the stability of mortgage lending. The main 
drawback of subprime mortgage lending and the financial system was not that 
they were dysfunctional, but that they were constructed on the wrong assumption 
that risk was being distributed and dispersed. This assumption created a “pass the 
parcel” situation and led to a paradox under which insuring against risk increased 
the probability of the undesirable outcome. 
The demand-side reasons for the subprime mortgage crisis stemmed from 
reckless mortgage lending to subprime borrowers, a response to high demand by 
prospective homeowners with problematic creditworthiness, who were either 
unaware of the risks they were taking or felt confident that rising property prices 
would protect them from loss. High demand for mortgage products was caused by 
the favourable economic climate of the late 1990s and the early 2000s. According 
to Blanchard (2013: 24), under the Clinton and Bush administrations, a steady 
growth rate and budget surplus were achieved. According to Davies (2010: 22), 
gross domestic product growth averaged 3.8% per annum for the years 1993-
2001. The stable, low-interest rate environment brought about a two-decade 
period of steady real estate price growth. The following diagram captures the 
change in nominal house prices in the twenty biggest metropolitan areas in the 
United States from 1992 to 2008, based on a compilation of the Case-Shiller 
home price index by the rating agency Standard & Poor’s:   
1
Rusinov: Moral Hazard and Mispriced Systemic Risk in the 2007 US Subprime Mortgage Crisis




Growth rates were positive for all years between 1992 and 2007, and reached an 
impressive 15% in 2001 and 21% in 2005. This unprecedented sustained growth 
in property prices was cause for much “irrational exuberance” among home 
owners, property investors and mortgage lenders. In a study conducted in San 
Francisco in 2005, Shiller (2008: 45) discovered that the mean expected increase 
in price among homebuyers over the next ten years was 14% a year, a very 
optimistic outlook not supported by most long-term trends. Subprime mortgages, 
which had existed since the mid-1990s but became more prevalent in the 2000s, 
allowed people who might have difficulties repaying their loans or troubled credit 
histories to get mortgages and purchase properties. In theory, the risk should have 
been minimised by higher, adjustable interest rates on subprime loans. Shiller 
(2008: 70) explains that subprime borrowers were motivated by the increase in 
property prices, whose longevity seemed like a promise for further growth in the 
long run. According to Blanchard (2013: 205), the fact that real estate prices had 
not been affected by the 2000-2001 recession also provided a sense of security to 
both borrowers and lenders.  
In terms of moral hazard, subprime borrowers believed that rising prices 
guaranteed that they could always sell their property, pay back the mortgage loan 
and still have positive returns since the value of the mortgage would have 
decreased over time relative to the value of the house. According to Buckley (211: 
87), who quotes statistics from a Federal Reserve Board report on US domestic 
loans, subprime lending increased at a rate of 25% a year over that period, which 
made subprime mortgages by far the fastest-growing mortgage product. 
Moreover, as Mian and Sufi (2009: 3) point out, the expansion of mortgage credit 
in primarily subprime-borrower neighbourhoods in the United States occurred 
2




despite a strong decline in real, and sometimes absolute, incomes from 2002 to 
2005. All of this evidence suggests that high demand for subprime mortgages 
exposed the market to the risks of moral hazard. High demand occurred because 
of positive macroeconomic tendencies but despite negative microeconomic 
realities. According to Stockhammer (2011: 236), this model was not sustainable 
in the long run: When its ability to maintain further price increase came to an end 
in 2006, prices plummeted, making many subprime mortgages impossible to 
repay.  
Another important and often overlooked driver of subprime mortgage 
expansion, in the argument of Lybeck (2011: 112), was the growth of information 
technology, which made it easier for lenders and borrowers to connect and 
allowed lenders to reach a larger pool of prospective clients. Two-thirds of all 
mortgages in the United States from 2003 to 2007 were lent on the internet. 
Lybeck (2008: 113) also claims that demand for subprime mortgages was 
combined with information asymmetries because some lenders withheld or 
misrepresented the drawbacks of mortgage loans and created the impression that 
rising prices would be sufficient to repay any loan. The asymmetry was 
exacerbated when mortgages were repackaged into securities and sold to investors 
in a moral hazard attempt to shift subprime risk to agents who could never know 
the whole truth about subprime borrowers. The behavior of lending companies 
fueled the rise in demand: According to Mian and Sufi’s (2009: 1450) study of 
mortgage lending by postal code, areas that experienced the largest increase in 
credit demand also had the lowest loan denial rates, and lenders tended to assign 
less importance to lenders’ loan-to-income ratios in those regions than in other, 
less credit-dependent ones. Haughwout and Mayer (2009: 36) show that subprime 
loans were less expensive in areas with greater past house appreciation, reflecting 
the expectation of lenders that rising prices will minimise risk. Thus, by lowering 
the threshold for getting a mortgage and by making use of information 
technology, lenders inflated demand for mortgages. This was an example of moral 
hazard because borrowers believed the risk from taking a subprime loan would be 
minimised by rising real estate prices.  
 The supply-side reasons for the subprime mortgage crisis complemented 
the demand-side ones and made it possible for moral-hazard thinking to inflate a 
housing bubble from the early-2000s onwards. Demand-side moral hazard can be 
divided into three risk evaluation subcategories: that of mortgage lenders, of 
investors, and of the US government. According to Shiller (2008: 51), mortgage 
lenders, aware of the risks of subprime lending but with apparent firm belief in the 
longevity of the growing bubble, stimulated demand for loans by introducing new 
mortgage products after 2000. These were loans with adjustable interest rates, no 
strict requirements for accompanying documentation, and loan-to-value ratios of 
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115-120%. Davies (2010: 36) claims that rising prices seemingly meant that such 
lending practices would be profitable because even if the borrower defaulted on 
their loan, which they were likely to do, the lender could foreclose the property 
and sell it for a profit. In other words, a situation of moral hazard was created as 
lenders were supposedly protected against risk of default by rising prices. 
Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011: 1850) claim that lower interest rates after the 
collapse of the 2001 dot-com bubble meant that lenders could use cheap leverage 
to fund their lending activities, which prompted them to explore riskier niches of 
the mortgage market.  
The risk borne by lenders was seemingly lowered even more by 
securitising mortgages and selling them to other investors and financial 
institutions (Purnanandam, 2011: 1881). Demand for asset-backed securities 
(ABS) on the secondary mortgage market incentivised mortgage lenders to sell 
large amounts of subprime products to property buyers and then repackage them 
into securitised financial instruments. According to Jacobs (2009: 21) these 
instruments were attractive to investors because they were rooted in the housing 
market, which was seen as a secure part of the economy unaffected by the 2001 
recession, and because they pooled thousands of loans from different parts of the 
country, thereby dispersing risk. In addition, investors could borrow money at the 
low Federal Reserve rate and then use leverage to buy mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS). Repackaging MBS into collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and selling 
them to other investors, most often pension and sovereign funds and foreign 
banks, was used to reduce risk even further. According to Stanton and Wallace 
(2011: 3276) rating agencies persisted in giving consistently high ratings to 
mortgage securities because they believed that price growth would continue. 
According to Shiller (2008: 50), even if they had theoretical doubts about giving 
high ratings, there was no evidence from the market to substantiate these doubts. 
There has been criticism regarding a possible conflict of interests in the rating 
process as rating agencies were paid fees by MBS originators; competition 
between agencies would naturally result in higher ratings as they would be willing 
to attract clients by recommending their products (Stanton and Wallace, 2011: 
3273). As investors thought they were dissipating and distributing risk by buying 
and selling MBS products, they created moral hazard, which made the subprime 
financial markets dangerously interdependent and vulnerable.   
 Government policy aimed at helping lower-income people to buy a home 
of their own has also been blamed as one of the supply-side causes of the 
subprime crisis. According to An and Bostic (2009: 360), the Community 
Reinvestment Act of 1997 paved the way for the expansion of subprime lending. 
The Act compels banks to make loans to low-income borrowers and advises them 
to take into account other criteria, such as the belonging of potential borrowers to 
4




a “community of colour” alongside purely economic criteria. In addition, An and 
Bostic (2009: 340) claim that government-supported mortgage institutions 
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae backed subprime lending to correct inequalities in 
the mortgage market (Haughwout and Mayer, 2009: 33). The requirement of the 
1977 Act required “regulated financial institutions…to help meet the credit needs 
of the local communities in which they are chartered.” According to Davies 
(2010: 104), from 1995 onwards Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac received tax 
incentives to buy MBS, and in 1996 they were required to ensure that at least 42% 
of the mortgages they bought were made to low-income borrowers. By the 
summer of 2008, Fannie Mae had bought $553 billion worth of subprime 
mortgages, and the same was roughly true of Freddie Mac.  
Despite warnings from the Federal Reserve chairman Greenspan that the 
leverage ratio of debt to MBS should be limited in the two companies, no 
substantial measures were taken, suggesting that political aims of equality in the 
housing market prevailed (Ferrari-Filho, 2011: 216). Just like lenders, rating 
agencies, and financial institutions, the US government believed that the upward 
real estate price trend will continue unabated for years to come, under which 
conditions subprime lending functioned well and the risk of borrowers defaulting 
was distributed around the financial system (Davidson, 2008: 669). When that 
assumption was no longer true, however, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ended up 
with worthless MBS which had been bought on leverage for trillions of dollars; 
this required their bailout by the US Treasury. However, as Brancaccio and 
Fontana (2011: 59) point out, there is little evidence to suggest that monetary 
policy played a main role in the formation of the housing bubble. 
 Despite all of these reasons, however, the subprime crisis would never 
have happened if the housing bubble had not burst in 2006, sending shocks over 
the entire US economy due to the complex and poorly understood connections 
between housing and finance. This fall could not have been predicted, but it was 
the natural final stage of the property cycle which started in the early 1990s (Roll, 
2011: 12). No regulator, rating agency, or financial firm could have known that 
critical mass would be reached in 2006, but their belief that this moment will 
come after many years was another example of moral hazard. The example of the 
dot-com bubble and its collapse in 2001 was not linked by analysts to the housing 
market due to a belief in the its stability per se: Shiller (2008: 69) describes this as 
the idea that because population and the economy are growing on limited land 
resources, the price of real estate must inevitably keep rising through time. While 
this is broadly true in the long run, it does not prevent the formation of bubbles 
and their subsequent crash in the short and medium run, as was the case with the 
subprime mortgage crisis. Shiller (2008: 70) explains that it is not realistic to 
expect gross domestic product growth to be proportional to the increase in house 
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prices, or that macroeconomic tendencies should inextricably be linked to real 
estate prices. According to Caggiano, Franzen and Howell (2008: 626), critical 
mass was reached in 2006 due to a number of factors, one of which was the 
oversupply of housing driven by expanding demand, which was boosted by the 
stable macroeconomic environment and cheap credit. According to Stockhammer 
(2011: 236), by mid-2006 demand had outstripped supply, and some more 
knowledgeable buyers realized that prices had become excessive and hurried to 
sell their properties. This caused a fall in prices, which led to a rising number of 
defaults of subprime borrowers from the middle of 2006 onwards. 
Although the underlying economic dynamics were not under the control of 
regulators or agents on the primary and secondary mortgage markets, a 
compelling argument can be made that regulation should and could have been 
improved to limit the moral hazard game of “pass the parcel.” According to 
Davies (2010: 35), mortgage lenders and MBS investors routinely operated with 
too little capital and high leverage ratios. This caused a liquidity squeeze when the 
subprime defaults began, and foreclosures could not restore the level of liquidity 
necessary to offset losses. Therefore, new capital regulations are needed to ensure 
that financial institutions operate with smaller debt-to-assets ratios to ensure their 
robustness if the value of their assets diminishes, as happened during the subprime 
mortgage crisis. Moral hazard can be minimised through regulation by shifting the 
responsibility to bail out suffering financial institutions from taxpayers to the 
institutions themselves. According to Krugman (2009: 76), firms should be 
allowed to fail in a lawful manner without help from the government. The end of 
the “too big to fail” attitude will prevent investors and mortgage lenders from 
sharing responsibility with taxpayers and thus reduce moral hazard. Lybeck (2011: 
97) suggests that if a large financial institutions with great relative importance for 
economic health runs into trouble, it should be bailed out, but with funds from a 
rescue pool to which all financial institutions will be expected to contribute. This 
move will decrease moral hazard, but will not completely remove it since 
financial behemoths engaging in risky behaviour will still be guaranteed a form of 
relief. Timothy Geithner, as quoted by Lybeck (2011:105), argued that this 
solution, while keeping moral hazard in place, would exclude taxpayers from 
sharing the responsibility, which is democratically fair. According to An and 
Bostic (2009: 364), unlimited government support for subprime lending should 
radically be scaled back, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should hold the 
mortgages they underline to much more anxious scrutiny. The collapse of the 
bubble from mid-2006 onwards was certainly one of the most important reasons 
for the crisis and could not have been prevented. What could have been prevented 
was the moral hazard infection which created a false sense of security for 
everyone in the mortgage market. The issue of “irrational exuberance” was one of 
unfounded belief in the stability of the property markets shared by homebuyers, 
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lenders, investors, rating agencies, and regulators. 
 The subprime crisis was caused by high demand for subprime mortgage 
products underpinned by the unrealistic assumption that property prices would 
keep rising indefinitely. The subprime mortgage market worked well as long as 
prices were rising and demand for property was high. When these two conditions 
were violated and the housing bubble collapsed, the system became dysfunctional, 
many subprime borrowers defaulted, and mortgage-backed securities lost much of 
their value. The crisis would never have occurred without the price slump, but the 
bubble would not have inflated if subprime lenders had not been allowed to 
engage in moral hazard behavior. Prevention could have been achieved through 
regulatory measures which shifted the risk back from taxpayers and investors to 
loan originators. The subprime mortgage crisis was caused by misplaced 
confidence, a product of moral hazard which could have been avoided if 
homebuyers, mortgage lenders and investors had borne more of the risk they 
created. Fair distribution of risk should be the main objective of regulators if such 
crises are to be avoided in the future.    
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